Intangible Interests Under the Personal Injury Exception to the Indiana Survival Act by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 35 | Issue 3 Article 7
Spring 1960
Intangible Interests Under the Personal Injury
Exception to the Indiana Survival Act
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1960) "Intangible Interests Under the Personal Injury Exception to the Indiana Survival Act," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 35 : Iss. 3 ,
Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol35/iss3/7
NOTES
just. Finally, if a net income or net worth system were applied to cor-
porations, and the present gross income tax retained, domestic corpora-
tions, who are presently required to pay gross income tax, would be sub-
ject to double taxation. This difficulty could be eliminated only if a
credit towards the net worth tax were allowed for all gross income tax
paid by the corporation."' This would equalize the tax burden of foreign
and domestic corporations, and consequently cause industries engaged in
interstate sales to bear the main impact of the net worth tax. "2  The
second alternative, retaining the present gross income tax and adopting a
net income tax applicable only to interstate sales, would encounter most
of the same objections enumerated above regarding the first alternative.
This plan would have the additional disadvantage of requiring the state
to administer two separate types of tax systems simultaneously.
The third alternative which may be utilized to tax interstate trans-
actions is a reasonably apportioned gross income tax. The present Indi-
ana gross income tax statute could be amended by adding an apportion-
ment feature patterned after that used in Minnesota, "3 but substituting
gross receipts for net income. The application of a gross income tax to
interstate sales would be subject to the same criticisms presently leveled
against the gross income tax, however, this alternative would facilitate
administration and would not necessitate establishment of a new state
tax system. Regardless of the method utilized, two basic requirements
must be met: first, any tax on interstate sales must include a reasonable
apportionment formula; second, the conditions set forth in 15 U.S.C.A.
381 (Supp. 1959) must be fulfilled.
INTANGIBLE INTERESTS UNDER THE PERSONAL INJURY
EXCEPTION TO THE INDIANA SURVIVAL ACT
Under the prior Indiana survival act actions for personal injuries
did not survive the death of the plaintiff, and in the event of the defend-
ant's death the damages in actions for personal injuries were limited in
51. A provision for a credit of this type is now being studied by the Ind. Comm'n
on State Tax and Financing Policy.
52. INDIANA TAX STUDY COMMf'N, op. cit. supra note 44, at 165.
53. Indiana could pattern its statute after that of Minnesota, by taking the revenue
derived from sales to customers within the state and dividing this by total sales revenue,
thus arriving at the percentage of sales subject to taxation in Indiana. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 92-3113 (1950).
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kind and amount.1 The 1959 Indiana legislature passed an amendment
to the survival act 2 which further modifies the common law rule that all
personal rights of action are terminated by the death of either party.'
This amendment removes the damage limitation in the event of the de-
fendant's death, and allows personal injury actions to survive the plain-
tiff's death but only to the extent that the plaintiff had incurred medical
expenses and losses of income prior to his death.4 This limitation on
survival clearly is applicable when the injuries in question are physical;
it is questionable, however, whether injuries to the intangible interests of
the decedent, represented in actions such as libel, slander, malicious prose-
cution, false imprisonment and invasion of privacy, will be subject to the
limitation. If the term "personal injuries" in the statute is interpreted to
exclude injuries to the intangible interests of the decedent, actions for
such injuries will survive in full. If the term is interpreted broadly to
include injuries to the decedent's intangible interests, these actions will be
subject to the limitation on survival. If those actions named are subject
to the survival limitation, the greatest sources of recovery-mental an-
guish, shame and humiliation, as well as any punitive damages will die
1. "All causes of action shall survive, and may be brought, notwithstanding the
death of the person entitled or liable to such action, by or against the representative of
the deceased party, except actions for personal injuries to the deceased party and for
promises to marry. . . . In any action for personal injuries or wrongful death surviv-
ing because of this section, the damages, if any recovered, shall not exceed the reason-
able medical, hospital or funeral expenses incurred, and a sum not to exceed five thou-
sand dollars [$5,000] for any and all other loss, if sustained." Ind. Acts 1955, ch. 257,§ 1.
2. IN . ANN. STAT. § 2-403 (Burns Supp. 1959).
3. Those instances in which a person's death is caused by the defendant's wrong-
ful act give rise to a new cause of action in favor of the decedent's beneficiaries under
the Indiana wrongful death act. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-404 (Burns Supp. 1959). The
survival act is applicable only to those causes of action existing in favor of or against
the decedent at the time of his death, without regard to the cause of his death.
4. "All causes of action shall survive, and may be brought notwithstanding the
death of the person entitled or liable to such action, by or against representatives of the
deceased party, except actions for personal injuries to the deceased party, which shall
survive only to the extent provided herein. . . . Provided, however, That when the
person receives personal injuries caused by the wrongful act or omission of another and
thereafter dies from causes other than said personal injuries so received, the personal
representative of the person so injured may maintain an action against the wrongdoer to
recover damages resulting from such injuries, if the person so injured might have main-
tained such action had he or she lived; but provided further that the personal represen-
tative of said injured party shall be permitted to recover only the reasonable medical,
hospital and nursing expense and loss of income of said injured person, resulting from
such injury, from the date of the injury to the date of his death." IND. ANN. STAT. §
2-403 (Burns Supp. 1959).
5. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955)
(invasion of right of privacy) ; Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N.E. 875 (1902)
(false imprisonment) ; Felkner v. Scarlet, 29 Ind. 154 (1867) (seduction) ; Pontius v.
Kimbel, 56 Ind. App. 144, 104 N.E. 981 (1914) (malicious prosecution). See generally
McCou Icic, DAMAGES 375-92, 415-47 (1935).
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with the plaintiff. Although medical expenses' or losses of income'
might be regarded as elements of damage in some of these actions, they
generally form only a small part of the recovery.
Whether a term such as "personal injuries" will be given a broad or
a limited interpretation will depend upon the prior common law, the sur-
rounding language of the present survival act, the language of earlier
survival acts, as well as the context in which the problem arises, that of
the survival of actions.
The English common law rule allowing survival of actions ex con-
tractu and not those cx delicto8 was modified in 1330 by an act which
gave executors an action for the goods and chattels of their testator "car-
ried away" in his lifetime.' This exception did not apply against a per-
sonal representative of a deceased tort-feasor until the decision in Hambly
v. Trott"0 which allowed an action of conversion to survive the tort-
feasor's death because "so far as the act of the offender is beneficial his
assets ought to be answerable. . . ." The common law distinction be-
tween ex contractu and ex delicto was modified further by Chamberlain
,. Uilliamnson" in which an action for breach of promise to marry, al-
though ex contractu rather than ex delicto, was not allowed to survive the
plaintiff's death because the injury was purely personal and there was no
damage to decedent's estate. This examination of the type of damage in-
curred rather than the form of action was continued in an 1833 statute
which provided that executors could bring actions for injuries to the real
estate of their decedents, and made the personal representative liable for
injury to real or personal property caused by his decedent." The empha-
sis on injury to property was followed in Bradshaw v. Lancashire and Y.
RyY which allowed recovery of decedent's medical expenses and loss of
income arising from physical injuries received while a passenger on de-
6. Damages for physical injury may be an element of recovery in false imprison-
ment. 22 AM. JUR. False Imprisonment § 129 (1939). There is a split of authority as
to allowance of damages for physical illness in actions for libel or slander. 33 Am. JuR.
Libel and Slander § 206 (1941) ; Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1175 (1934).
7. In an action for publication of false statements concerning the plaintiff's fi-
nancial condition, the general nature of his business and the injury likely to result were
considered on the question of damages. Wayne Works v. hicks Body Co., 115 Ind.
App. 10, 55 N.E.2d 382 (1944).
8. The rule appears to have arisen from the fact that causing physical injury was
a felony, and any civil remedy for damages was unknown. The reasoning behind not
allowing a felony action to survive is obvious. See Winfield, Death as Affecting Lia-
bility in Tort, 29 CoLUm. L. REv. 239, 241 (1929).
9. 4 Edw. III, c. 7 (1330).
10. 1 Cowp. 373, 376, 98 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1139 (K.B. 1776).
11. 2 M.&S. 408, 105 Eng. Rep. 433 (K.B. 1814).
12. 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 42 (1833).
13. L.R. 10 C.P. 189 (1875).
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fendant's railroad. The court, relying on the fact that there was pecuni-
ary loss to the decedent's estate, allowed recovery although the action was
of a personal nature.
It was in the background of these cases and statutes that the Indiana
case of Boor v. Lowery 4 was decided. The defendant doctor died after
plaintiff had commenced an action for improper treatment of his shoul-
der. Among other damages, the plaintiff specifically alleged that he had
incurred additional medical expenses in treating the disability arising
from the defendant's improper treatment. Instead of allowing recovery
for this pecuniary loss as was done in the Bradshaw case" the Indiana
court devised a rule denying any recovery where the action is based "pri-
marily"' 6 on injury to the person and pecuniary loss is merely an "inci-
dent"' 7 of the personal injury. In support of this prinary-incidental test,
the court cited a number of cases involving the survival of actions for
breach of promise to marry including Chamberlain v. Williamson and did
not distinguish them from the principal case even though breach of prom-
ise to marry deals with injuries which are purely intangible and involve
no pecuniary loss, either "primary" or "incidental."'" The test was
further refined in a case where the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries
to the person resulting from a landlord's breach of a covenant to repair."
Although the plaintiff specifically alleged pecuniary loss in the form of
medical expenses and loss of income, the court held against survival on
the ground that there would have been no pecuniary loss had no physical
injury occurred. Thus, the test for determining what injuries were "pri-
mary" and what were "incidental" for purposes of survival became anal-
ogous to the sine qua non test of causation.
At the time these Indiana cases were decided, the survival act pro-
vided: "A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person, dies
with the person of either party . . . . All other causes of action sur-
14. 103 Ind. 468, 3 N.E. 151 (1885).
15. "Another argument for the defendants was, that inasmuch as the remedy for
the personal injury died with the person, the damages to the estate being consequential
on the personal injury, died also. I do not at all see that that follows as a necessary or
logical consequence. The two sorts of damage are separable: the one is pecuniary loss
to the estate immediately and naturally arising out of the accident; the other is personal
to the party injured and as such dies with the person." Bradshaw v. Lancashire and
Y. Ry., L.R. 10 C. P. 189, 192 (1875).
16. Boor v. Lowery, 103 Ind. App. 468, 471, 3 N.E. 151, 152 (1885).
17. Id. at 475, 3 N.E. at 151.
18. Lord Ellenborough said, "Where the damage done to the personal estate can be
stated on the record that involves a different question." Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2
M.&S. 408, 416, 105 Eng. Rep. 433, 436 (K.B. 1814).
19. Feary v. Hamilton, 140 Ind. 45, 39 N.E. 516 (1894).
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vive .. ,'o If the Indiana court had correctly interpreted the English
precedents under the original acts it would have distinguished between
damages for pain and suffering, which are personal and would not sur-
vive, and damages such as medical expenses and loss of income which
cause injury to the estate and which would survive; and no need would
have existed for the 1959 amendment specifically providing for the sur-
vival of medical expenses and loss of income.
Basing survival on the type of damage, whether to the estate or to
the person, rather than on the "primary" cause of action, appears sound.
Under this test, the injuries to intangible interests involved in humilia-
tion and mental anguish, would be regarded as personal and would not
survive. The use of any such test, however, would have to be warranted
by the language of the present statute.
The language of the proviso which contains the only exception to
complete survival, could be regarded as limited to physical injuries alone.2
The proviso refers to the plaintiff dying from causes "other than said
personal injuries so received . . ." Not only is it difficult to conceive
of an injury to the reputation resulting in death, but the word received
seems to connote the transfer of some sort of physical force. The terms
"medical, hospital and nursing expense" are also appropriate to physical
injury. In a District of Columbia case,22 the court allowed an action for
slander to survive under a statute which stated that any cause of action
survived the death of either party "Provided, however, that in tort ac-
tions, the said right of action shall be limited to damages for physical
injury except for pain and suffering resulting therefrom."2 3  The court
relied on the maxim of interpretation noscitur a sociis in holding that
since the term "tort actions" was used in connection with terms of physi-
cal injury, its import should be limited to actions for physical injuries
and should not apply to tort actions generally. The very same argument
could be made to limit the import of the survival limitation of the Indiana
act to physical injuries alone.
Although the language of the present Indiana act tends to support
the limited interpretation, the language of earlier survival acts suggests a
more inclusive meaning of "personal injuries." The 1881 act specifically
excluded actions for seduction, false imprisonment and malicious prose-
cution from the rule that "a cause of action for injury to the person dies
20. Actions excepted from this rule were seduction, false imprisonment and ma-
licious prosecution. Ind. Acts 1881, ch. 38, §§ 6-7. See note 24 infra.
21. See statute cited note 4 supra.
22. Soroka v. Beloff, 93 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1950).
23. D.C. CODE ANx. § 12-101 (1951).
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with the person of either party."2 4  Since most of the interests invaded
in seduction and false imprisonment, and the sole interest invaded in ma-
licious prosecution, are nonphysical, it may be concluded that the legisla-
ture regarded the term "injury to the person" as including nonphysical
injuries.
By amendment in 1937, "injury to the person" was replaced by the
present term "personal injuries. ' 25 This change in phraseology could
hardly be regarded as evidencing an intention to limit the term to physical
injuries, since the term "personal injuries" has been regarded as a broader
term than "injury to the person" whenever the question has been raised."4
Therefore, if "personal injuries" is examined in light of the language in
prior statutes, as well as the limiting language of the present statute, the
argument of nosctur a sociis is not nearly so persuasive.
The cases on survival of actions in other jurisdictions are of little
aid in interpreting the Indiana statute, since every state has its own dis-
tinctive survival statute. An examination of these statutes reveals that
all are distinguishable in important respects from the Indiana statute.
For that reason the interpretation given the phrases "personal injury" or
"injury to person" as used in these statutes should not be regarded as
authoritative by the Indiana courts. 7 For instance, the result under some
24. "Sec. 6. A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person, dies with the
person of either party, except, in cases in which an action is given for an injury causing
the death of any person, and actions for seduction, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution.
"Sec. 7. All other causes of action survive and may be brought by or against the
representatives of the deceased party except actions for promises to marry." Ind Acts
1881, ch. 38, §§ 6-7.
25. Ind. Acts 1937, ch. 292, § 2. The only change made by the 1955 amendment
was to increase the amount of damages from $1,000 to $5,000. See statute cited note 1
supra.
26. "We think the courts have generally failed to take into consideration that the
expression 'injuries to the person' and 'personal injuries' are not synonymous. . . . In
the former the noun 'person' indicates a natural body, or perhaps a body corporate, and
the injuries contemplated are injuries to that body. In the latter phrase the noun em-
ployed is 'injury,' and the word 'personal' is merely adjective, and, therefore, of far less
significance than when used substantively." Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63
Ariz. 294, 300, 162 P.2d 133, 137 (1945). In light of the result in this case, the distinc-
tion drawn appears superficial. Invasion of right of privacy resulting in mental anguish
was regarded as an "injury to the person" which survived, while an action for libel was
a "personal injury" to character or reputation which did not survive.
If any weight is to be given to this distinction it might be significant that the phrase
"injuries to the person or character" is used in the joinder of actions statute, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-301 (Burns 1946), the statute of limitations, IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-602 (Burns
Supp. 1959), and the married woman's rights act, IND. ANN. STAT. § 38-115 (Burns
1949).
27. In the following cases the phrases were not limited to physical injury: Johnson
v. Bradstreet, 87 Ga. 79, 13 S.E. 250 (1891) (libel an "injury to the person" which
survives) ; Houston Printing Co. v. Dement, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 30, 44 S.W. 558 (1898)
(libel among "personal injuries" which survive).
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statutes of finding "personal injury" limited to physical injuries is that
actions for injury to an intangible interest would not survive.2" A simi-
lar interpretation of the Indiana act would result in complete survival of
these same actions.
Since it appears that either the broad or limited interpretation is con-
sistent with the language of the Indiana statute, it becomes necessary to
examine the area of policy as expressed through legislative intent. If
the survival act is to be regarded as an expression of policy, as all legisla-
tive actions are ideally regarded, then the broad interpretation should be
adopted. The act would then express the policy that only those injuries
which cause a diminution of the decedent's estate should survive2 -the
policy correctly stated, but incorrectly applied, in the early Indiana cases.3"
The limited interpretation would produce an anomaly in that subjective
damages for mental anguish, shame and humiliation would be fully re-
coverable in actions for libel, slander or invasion of privacy, while non-
physical damages for pain and suffering resulting from physical injuries
would not survive. Unfortunately anomalies such as these are not new
in the Indiana law of survival; the original survival act permitted re-
covery of the nonphysical damages in malicious prosecution, seduction
28. Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 296 (1883) (malicious prosecution not surviving
as a "wrong done to the person") ; Shedd v. Patterson 230 Ill. App. 553 (1923) (ma-
licious prosecution not surviving as "an injury to the person") ; Denslow v. Hutchinson,
152 Ill. App. 502 (1910) ; Catchings v. Hartman, 178 Miss. 672, 174 So. 553 (1937)
(slander not surviving as a "personal action") ; Young v. Aylesworth, 35 R. I. 259, 86
Atl. 555 (1913) (conspiracy to deprive decedent of membership in an organization not
surviving as "trespass on the case for damages to the person") ; Carver v. Morrow, 213
S. C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948) (libel by will not surviving as "injury to the person").
29. This is the policy which has been expressed by the California court in the light
of statutory language much more restrictive than that of the Indiana statute. In Moffat
v. Smith, 33 Cal. 2d 905, 206 P.2d 353 (1949) the plaintiff, injured in an automobile
accident, was permitted to recover under a statute which provided that: "Any person
or his personal representative may maintain an action against the executor or adminis-
trator of any testator or intestate who in his lifetime has wasted, destroyed, taken or
carried away, or converted to his own use, the goods or chattels of any such person, or
committed any trespass on the real estate of such person." CAL. PROD. CODE § 574
(1956). The property damage found here was plaintiff's inability to carry on and ad-
vance in his occupation. In Vallindras v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 255 P.2d
457 (Cal. App. 1953), rev'd oIn other grounds, 42 Cal. 2d 149, 265 P.2d 907 (1954), an
action for false imprisonment was held to survive to the extent that there had been in-
jury to property in the form of loss of income and attorneys' fees.
30. Feary v. Hamilton, 140 Ind. 45, 39 N.E. 516 (1894) ; Boor v. Lowery, 103 Ind.
App. 468, 3 N.E. 151 (1885). By virtue of IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-405 (Burns 1946) a
personal injury action survives the plaintiff who dies subsequent to a judgment in his
favor in the trial court, but prior to the reversal of the judgment by the Supreme or
Appellate Court. In Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. Co. v. McCullough, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N.E.
206 (1915) the court said that this statute created a logical exception to the general
rule that personal injury actions did not survive, because once a claim is reduced to
judgment it becomes an asset of the decedent's estate. The court regarded the protection
of a decedent's estate as a proper grounds for allowing survival even of a personal injury
action.
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and false imprisonment while all other injuries to the person, even those
involving pecuniary loss, died with the person.
31
Considering the policy of excepting all nonphysical damages from
survival apart from the context of statutory construction, one finds that
the only other policy which has received any substantial support is that
favoring complete survival of all actions. 2 The basic difference between
the proponents of these policies is their view of the nature of damages.
Those favoring complete survival regard all damages as compensatory
and thus affecting the estate." This argument is circuitous since the
basic question-for what type of loss is the plaintiff being compen-
sated-remains. If the loss was not actual, pecuniary and measurable,
then the decendent's estate cannot be said to have been diminished and
his heirs have not been injured. It is the pecuniary loss to the decedent's
heirs which forms the damages under the Indiana wrongful death act.3 '
Certain revisions are required if the language of the Indiana act is
to invoke explicitly the policy that all subjective elements of damage die
with the person, while damage resulting in pecuniary loss to the estate
remains recoverable. Some states have attempted to invoke this policy
by specifically excluding certain forms of action, such as libel and ma-
licious prosecution, from survival.3 This approach not only falls within
the statutory interpretation problem created by the maxim expressio unius
31. The removal of any limitation on the damages that survive the death of the
tort-feasor has produced another anomalous situation in regard to the recovery of puni-
tive or exemplary damages under the present survival act. Since the purpose of these
damages is to punish the tort-feasor for being "reckless" or "malicious," there is no
logical reason for allowing these damages to survive when the tort-feasor dies. This
fact was recognized in Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 486, 31 P.2d 388, 395 (1934) where
it was said: "Since the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer for his
acts accompanied by evil motive, and to deter him from the commission of like wrongs
in the future, the reason for such damages ceases to exist with his death."
32. See Evans, A Comparative Study of the Survival of Tort Claims For and
Against Executors and Administrators, 31 MicH. L. Rav. 969, 986 (1929).
33. "Since compensation is the purpose of modern tort recovery it should accrue
not only to a living person but also to his estate. On this analysis, the coincidence of
the deaths of both parties is immaterial. The Wisdom of excepting from survival such
causes as defamation, seduction, and breach of promise of marriage seems questionable.
As civil actions, they are not primarily punitive; moreover, while the interest invaded
may not be a pecuniary one, compensation necessarily takes the form of money damages."
Note, Inadequacies of English and State Survival Statuftes, 48 Hv. L. REv. 1008, 1012
(1935).
34. Northern Power Co. v. West, 218 Ind. 321, 32 N.E.2d 713 (1941) ; Consolidated
Stone Co. v. Staggs, 164 Ind. 331, 73 N.E. 695 (1905).
35. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-1-9 (Supp. 1957) (slander or libel); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 411.140 (1959) (slander, libel and criminal conversation); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1052 (1951) (libel, slander, malicious prosecution, nuisance) ; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 287.01 (1958) (slander or libel).
NOTES
est excusio alterius,30 but it is not satisfactory where there is a pecuniary
loss to the estate arising out of one of these forms of action. A more
logical revision would be to eliminate any reference to survival based on
the form of the action, but to refer instead to the type of injury in ques-
tion. The present Indiana act names "medical, hospital and nursing ex-
pense and loss of income" as injuries to be recovered, but this list does
not exhaust the type of injuries which could cause diminution of the de-
cedent's estate. Attorneys' fees arising from false imprisonment or ma-
licious prosecution, or a damage to a property interest arising from an
invasion of privacy" are examples of such injuries not provided for by the
terminology in the present statute. Rather than enumerate various types
of injuries which diminish the decedent's estate and which should thus
survive, the statute should merely state that only those injuries causing
pecuniary loss to the estate should survive.
ADMISSIBILITY IN INDIANA OF DECLARATIONS MADE
BEFORE OR AFTER EXECUTION OF A WILL
An exception to the hearsay rule permits a declaration by a declarant
concerning his then-existent state of mind to be admitted into evidence as
proof of his mental state at the time of the declaration.' This exception
has been extended, under certain circumstances to allow such declarations
into evidence as a basis for the inference that the then-existent state of
mind produced subsequent conduct in accordance with that state of mind ;'
declarations also have been admitted, but to a much lesser extent, to infer
previous conduct.3 Even though the courts have been reluctant to expand
this exception, declarations by a testator uttered before and after the ex-
36. In Gray v. Wallace, 319 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958) the action was for
malicious prosecution. Under the Missouri survival act, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 537.020-.030
(1953), actions for slander, libel, assault and battery and false imprisonment were
specifically excluded from survival. Nevertheless, the action for malicious prosecution
was held to survive due to the legislature's failure to specifically name it in the statute.
37. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
1. A brief discussion of declarations of mental state is found in McCormick, Evi-
dence 567-578 (1954).
2. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892) ; Atherton v. Gaslin, 194
Ky. 460, 239 S.W. 771 (1922).
3. Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal. 2d 523, 127 P.2d 530 (1942); Moyer v. Moyer, 64
Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911 (1924) ; Atherton v. Gaslin, 194 Ky. 460, 239 S.W. 771 (1922).
But most courts would probably argue as Justice Cardozo did in Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96, 105, 106 (1933), where he said: "Declarations of intention, casting
light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory,
pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule
against hearsay if the distinction were ignored."
